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McMahan in arguing must be separate. The practical humanitarianism that he endorses would seem to be morally grounded — is this really a distinction between morality and law, or one between two levels of morality? Finally, Sherman's paper, again typically of the author, casts light on the awkward interstices of war's phenomenology, the dark nooks that high-minded philosophy is often inclined to ignore.

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Perception, by Howard Robinson. London: Routledge, 1994. H/b £80.00, P/b £23.99.

Howard Robinson's *Perception* is now rightly regarded as essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the sense-datum theory of perception and its motivations. It should also be regarded as essential reading for those with a more general philosophical interest in perception and sensory consciousness. As well as discussing the history of the sense-datum theory, and the nature of sense-data and their relation to the physical world, Robinson offers critiques of physicalist theories of perception, intentional/representational theories, adverbial theories, and naive realist/disjunctivist theories. Along the way he also discusses Wittgenstein's private language argument and the nature of secondary qualities. Over the course of the book we are presented with a sustained, and forthright, defence of a sense-datum theory in its traditional form. The arguments are clear, briskly delivered, and challenging. Here I highlight two key elements in Robinson's case for a sense-datum theory, which I think pose an especially serious challenge for his opponents. These are his articulation and defence of the 'phenomenal principle' and his 'revised' causal argument for sense-data.

It is intuitive to think that there is a significant difference between sensing something and merely thinking about it, and that an adequate philosophical account of the nature of sensory experience should respect and be true to this difference. The idea that there is such a difference seems to be grounded, in part, in the sort of pre-scientific and pre-philosophical knowledge of our own minds that we have simply in virtue of being self-conscious subjects who can think and have sensory experiences. A number of philosophers have found plausible the idea that this pre-philosophical self-knowledge should serve as a clue to, and constraint on, a philosophical account of the nature of conscious

sensory experience; and one often finds that philosophical claims about the nature of conscious sensory experience are intertwined with claims about the sort of knowledge that we have, or can have, of those experiences when we have them.

The underlying assumption is something like the following: (a) one's conscious sensory experiences have a distinctive phenomenal character which is somehow manifest to one as a self-conscious subject when one has them. Once this assumption is in play, it can seem like a relatively small and innocent step to move to the claim that (b) a conscious sensory experience is a mental state/event that has distinctive phenomenal properties that the subject of that experience can introspectively attend to. If we further assume that the properties in question are either representational, non-representational, or both (and this would appear to exhaust the options), then the terms of a now familiar debate have been set. Can we account for the distinctive phenomenology of conscious experience by simply appealing to representational properties of experience, or do we need to appeal to non-representational phenomenal properties instead/as well? The sense-datum theorist is now usually side-lined in this debate, as those who defend the idea that experience has non-representational phenomenal properties (or qualia) do not generally take themselves to be defending a sense-datum theory. So from the point of view of the sense-datum theorist, what has gone awry in the framing of the current debate?

According to the sense-datum theory that Robinson defends, the concerns with phenomenology, and the appeals to introspection in grounding an account of perceptual experience, are legitimate. It is the move from (a) to (b)—or at least a certain understanding of it—that is suspect. Suspicions over the status of (b) are sometimes raised by those appealing to the claim that experience is 'transparent', but those who appeal to the transparency of experience are now—more often than not—representationalists seeking to undermine the claim that we can introspectively discern non-representational properties of experience. For the sense-datum theorist, Moore's original appeal to the transparency of experience should lead us to reconsider the move to (b), but not for reasons that lend support to representationalism. The lesson of Moore's appeal to transparency is, rather, that when we introspectively attend to an experience we do so by attending to entities that we are perceptually *aware of*—entities whose manifest properties (e.g. their colour and shape) are not—and do not seem to be—properties of our experience. The conclusion we are encouraged to draw is that the distinctive phenomenal character of experience mentioned in (a) is to be explained, at least in part, by the obtaining of a distinctive perceptual *relation* of 'awareness of', and not simply properties that are possessed by a mental event/state, where such properties are understood to be properties that the mental event/state can possess whether or not that psychological relation obtains.

At the heart of Robinson's case for a sense-datum theory is his defence of a claim that he labels the 'phenomenal principle'. According to this principle, 'if there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality' (p. 32). Robinson's attempt to defend the principle amounts to an attempt to defend the claim that nothing short of the obtaining of the psychological *relation of awareness of* that it mentions can adequately account for the phenomenology of experience. The important point here is that to engage properly with Robinson's argument for a sense-datum theory one needs to engage in a dispute that has hardly been settled: how to account for the phenomenal character of conscious sensory experience. So it is a mistake to think that one can simply dismiss the sense-datum theory by pointing to an 'intentional fallacy' in their arguments from illusion/hallucination. As Robinson puts it,

The issue with illusion does not concern the logic of 'appears' and similar words, but how to account for the phenomenology of appearance... The specially sensational or presentational element of perception must be accommodated, which the sense-datum theory does, but merely pointing out the intentionality of 'appears' does not. (p. 43)

Since the publication of Robinson's book, a growing number of philosophers have tried to argue—in defence of a naive realist account of perception—that we will not be able to provide an adequate account of the phenomenology of experience without appealing to the obtaining of a distinctive perceptual relation of 'awareness of' (or 'acquaintance'). And these philosophers have criticised purely representational accounts of the phenomenal character of experience for failing to acknowledge and accommodate the contribution that the obtaining of that relation makes to the conscious character of experience. Few would deny that when we see, hear, or touch something, we are thereby perceptually aware of something, but there is now a live debate over the question of what role, if any, should be accorded to that perceptual relation in an account of the phenomenology of experience. These on-going debates about the phenomenology of experience connect directly with concerns raised by Robinson in his defence of the phenomenal principle, and Robinson's arguments make an important contribution to them.

The book also includes important challenges to those naive realists who are sympathetic to a relational view of experience but who want to reject a sense-datum theory. The new relationalists, as we might call them, endorse the idea that we need to appeal to the obtaining of a distinctive kind of perceptual relation of *awareness of* when characterising the phenomenal character of experience, and in this they appear to agree with Robinson. However, they reject sense-datum theories of perception, for they claim that the relevant perceptual relation is one that subjects bear to material objects and their features, and not to the sorts of entities posited by sense-datum theorists.

This perceptual relation to material objects and their features cannot plausibly be held to obtain when a subject hallucinates. So a challenge for these new relationalists is to find something plausible to say about the experience one has when one hallucinates. Robinson presents one of the most powerful versions of this challenge in his revised causal argument, which targets naive realism.

The argument begins with the following plausible empirical claim: 'it is theoretically possible by activating some brain process which is involved in a particular type of perception to cause an hallucination which exactly resembles that perception in its subjective character' (p. 151). A second premise states that 'it is necessary to give the same account of the experiences involved in genuine perception and hallucination when they have the same neural cause' (p. 151). The general principle behind this second claim is 'same proximate cause, same immediate effect' (p. 154), and this principle is not entirely uncontroversial. But we can replace the second premise with a slightly weaker one that would still appear to pose problems for those who hold the naive realist relational view that Robinson is targeting. This is the claim that there are no conditions that are necessary for the occurrence of the kind of experience which occurs in the case of hallucination, which cannot also obtain in the case of genuine perception. This supports the claim that the kind of experience that occurs in the case of hallucination will also be produced in the case of genuine perception, which in turn makes plausible the general conclusion that Robinson wants to draw: 'there is a subjective element in all perception, for which a brain state is a sufficient cause, and which contains all those phenomenal features that we are familiar with in perception' (p. 162).

The brain state in question does not suffice to cause the obtaining of a subject's perceptual awareness of material objects and their features. So if the brain state is a sufficient cause for an experience whose phenomenal character can only be adequately accommodated by appeal to the obtaining of a perceptual relation of *awareness of*, then that relation is not one that subjects bear to material objects and their features. Crudely put, the challenge that this argument presents to those who hold a naive realist relational view is the following: Either give up the claim that we will not be able to provide an adequate account of the phenomenology of experience without appealing to the obtaining of a distinctive perceptual relation of 'awareness of', or give up the claim that the perceptual relation in question is one that we bear to material objects and their features, and accept instead that the perceptual relation is one we bear to sense-data.

Most of those who reject sense-datum theories will think that the appropriate response is to embrace the first disjunct. For those who are more sympathetic to some of the phenomenological concerns underlying Robinson's defence of the phenomenal principle, an alternative response is to question certain assumptions in the epistemology of mind, upon which Robinson's causal argument depends. One might think that when one

hallucinates, although one's epistemic position with respect to one's environment may be disadvantaged, one's epistemic position with respect to the conscious character of one's own experience is not. One is no better placed, epistemically speaking, to make judgements about the conscious character of one's experience when one perceives the world than when one hallucinates. For although one's environment may not be perceptually accessible to one when one hallucinates, one's experience is still introspectively accessible to one, and in the same way in which it is introspectively accessible to one in cases of successful perception. This is an assumption that I think the naive realist relationalist should reject. He should hold instead that an account of what one can know about the phenomenal character of the conscious experience one has when one perceives the world, and one's account of what puts one in a position to know it, cannot be straightforwardly and symmetrically applied to the case of hallucination.

The naive realist relationalist should agree with other opponents of a sense-datum theory that when a subject hallucinates, that subject is not perceptually aware of anything. But he should add that when a subject is hallucinating it is not just the subject's epistemic position with respect to his environment that is compromised. His epistemic position with respect to his own experience is also compromised; and this *because* he is not perceptually aware of anything. The naive realist maintains that when one perceives the world one seems to have available to one the kind of introspective access to one's experience that is made possible by having perceptual access to — by being perceptually aware of — the objects of one's experience. This is where they agree with the sense-datum theorist over the lessons to be learnt from Moore's appeal to the transparency of experience. Introspection of one's experience does not seem to be a matter of alighting on and discerning phenomenal properties that a mental event/state can possess whether or not the perceptual relation of *awareness of* obtains. When one hallucinates, one also seems to have available to one the kind of introspective access to one's experience that is made possible by being perceptually aware of objects of that experience. So the conclusion the naive realist should draw is that if one is not perceptually aware of anything when one hallucinates, one does not have the kind of introspective access to one's experience that one seems to have.

What can one know about the experience one undergoes in such circumstances? As self-conscious subjects we can qualify the perceptual judgements we make about the world. We can restrict our perceptual judgements to those concerned with the kind of perceptual access to, and perspective on, the world that we *seem* to have. But equally, we can qualify the introspective judgements we make about our experiences. We can restrict our judgements to those concerned with the kind of introspective access to our experience that we *seem* to have. In the case of hallucination, just as one is in a position to know what perceptually seems to one to be the case, one can know what

introspectively seems to one to be the case. What one can know of the conscious character of the experience one undergoes when one hallucinates is that it introspectively seems to one to have the conscious character of a genuine perceptual *awareness of* some entity or entities.

The subject's epistemic position with respect to the conscious character of the experience that he undergoes when he successfully perceives the world is somewhat different. In the case of successful perception the subject has available to him the kind of introspective access to his experience that he seems to have, because he has available to him the kind of perceptual access to objects of experience that he seems to have. The subject is in a position to acquire knowledge of the conscious character that the experience actually has, and not just knowledge of the conscious character that it introspectively seems to have. It is for this reason that the naive realist relationalist should hold that the right account of what one can know of the conscious character of the experience one undergoes when one perceives the world, and one's account of what puts one in a position to know it, cannot be straightforwardly and symmetrically applied to the case of hallucination. This is why he should resist the conclusion that Robinson wants to draw from his causal argument—that 'there is a subjective element in all perception, for which a brain state is a sufficient cause, and which contains all those phenomenal features that we are familiar with in perception' (p. 162).

This is just a brief sketch of a line of response to Robinson's causal argument; and it should be said that Robinson presents a number of other arguments challenging naive realism and its metaphysical commitments. Whether or not one agrees with the conclusions that Robinson draws from his arguments, his book succeeds in persuading one that it would be a mistake to think that one can now safely dismiss the once popular sense-datum option. To engage with the arguments that Robinson musters in support of a sense-datum theory is to engage with issues that are at the heart of current debates about perception and phenomenal consciousness.

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The Importance of Subjectivity: Selected Essays in Metaphysics and Ethics, by Timothy L. S. Sprigge, edited by Leemon B. McHenry. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011. Pp. xi + 355. H/b \$85.00/£45.00.

The title of this collection of essays by the late Timothy Sprigge (1932–2007) is taken from an inaugural lecture he gave upon his appointment to the Regius Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh in 1980, a position he held from 1979 to 1989. In this lecture, Sprigge criticized his fellow British philosophers for their inadequate grasp of the nature of